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1. The Dynamic Duo 
 
According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are 
conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material 
vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, 
body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors 
concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state 
of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on 
the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part” 
(Levin 2008). The respective fates of these two positions may not be 
independent of each other. The claim that ExC is in some way a form of, 
dependent on, entailed by, or at least commonly played out in terms of, 
functionalism is now pretty much part of the received view of things (see, e.g., 
Adams and Aizawa 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2005, 2008, this 
volume a, b, forthcoming; Menary 2007; Rupert 2004; Sprevak manuscript; 
Wheeler forthcoming). Thus ExC might be mandated by the existence of 
functionally specified cognitive systems whose boundaries are located partly 
outside the skin. This is the position that Andy Clark has recently dubbed 
extended functionalism (Clark 2008, forthcoming; see also Wheeler forthcoming).  
 
Against this background, the present paper has two main goals. The first 
(sections 2 and 3) is to clarify and amplify the relationship between ExC and 
functionalism, and thereby to plot the path to extended functionalism. The 
second (sections 4, 5 and 7) is to defend extended functionalism against three 
potentially damaging critical assaults. Section 6 is an interlude that highlights a 
key aspect of the extended functionalist picture. The paper ends (section 8) with 
a brief (and I mean brief) remark on extended functionalism and phenomenal 
consciousness.    
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2. The Extended Cognition Hypothesis 
 
ExC is a view about the whereabouts of thinking and thoughts that is distinct 
not only from the position adopted by orthodox (classical or connectionist) 
cognitive science, but also from the position adopted by any merely embodied-
embedded account of mind. That is why my opening characterization of ExC 
included the qualification that the target phenomena must be distributed over 
brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors 
concerned are themselves rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status. In 
other words, as Adams and Aizawa (e.g. 2008, this volume) have repeatedly 
emphasized, it is not sufficient for genuine cognitive extension that thinking be 
spatially distributed over brain, body and world solely in the weak sense that 
applies when some instance of intelligent behaviour is discovered to be causally 
dependent, perhaps in previously unexpected ways, on the bodily exploitation 
of certain external props or scaffolds. We may even introduce the additional 
feature that the cognitive task in question could not have been achieved by 
brains like ours without the causal contribution of the external elements in 
question. Still the shortfall remains. Bare causal dependence of mentality on 
external factors – even when that causal dependence is of the ‘necessary’ kind 
just highlighted – is simply not enough for genuine cognitive extension. What is 
needed is the constitutive dependence of mentality on external factors, the sort of 
dependence indicated by talk of the beyond-the-skin factors themselves rightly 
being accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status. Only this latter kind of 
distribution – we might call it ontological distribution – will do.  
 
In order to illustrate this crucial point, we can adapt an analysis due originally 
to Rumelhart et al. (1986) that has since become something of a stock example in 
the embodied-embedded-extended mind literature. Most of us solve difficult 
multiplication problems using pen and paper.2 The pen and paper resource is a 
beyond-the-skin factor that helps to transform a difficult cognitive problem into 
a set of simpler ones and acts as a temporary store for the results of intermediate 
calculations. For orthodox cognitive scientists and for supporters of the merely 
embodied-embedded view of mind, the pen and paper system is to be conceived as a 
noncognitive environmental prop. It is an external tool that aids certain 
cognitive processes via embodied interaction, but is not itself a proper part of 
those processes. Of course, orthodox cognitive scientists and embodied-
embedded theorists differ on how best to characterize the interactive 
arrangement of skin-side cognitive processes and external prop. In particular, 
the embodied-embedded theorist is likely to count the bodily activity involved 
as itself a cognitive process, as opposed to a mere output of neurally located 
 3 
cognition, and to trace rather less of the source of the manifest complexity of the 
observed behaviour to the brain, and rather more to the structured embodied 
interactions with the external pen and paper system. For all that, however, both 
of these camps ultimately think of cognition as a resolutely skin-side 
phenomenon. By contrast, the ExC theorist considers the coupled combination 
of pen-and-paper resource, appropriate bodily manipulations, and in-the-head 
processing to be a cognitive system in its own right, a system in which although 
the differently located elements make different causal contributions to the 
production of the observed intelligent activity, nevertheless each of those 
contributions enjoys a fully cognitive status. In my view, the supporting case for 
the hypothesis of embodied-embedded cognition has been successfully made 
over and over again.3 If that’s right, then the key issue facing ExC theorists right 
now is not how to argue against the received (if that’s what it still is) orthodox 
view in cognitive science, but rather how to justify the transition from a ‘merely’ 
embodied-embedded mind to an extended one.4 
 
 
3. From Functionalism to Extended Functionalism  
 
Some of the conceptual machinery required to effect the transition just identified 
plausibly comes in the form of a familiar philosophical theory of mind, namely 
functionalism. According to the traditional formulation of this view, the 
canonical statement of which is arguably due to Putnam (1967), a mental state 
counts as the mental state it does because of the causal relations it bears to 
sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental states. Who gets to 
decide what the psychologically relevant causal relations are (e.g. philosophers 
performing conceptual analyses of folk-psychological terms, psychologists 
performing scientific experiments) is a matter of intellectual debate. For the 
present the key point is this. As every undergraduate who has ever taken a class 
in philosophy of mind knows, traditional functionalism triumphantly frees us 
from a kind of neural or carbon chauvinism about the mind. In so doing it 
bolsters the intellectual credentials of Doctor Who, Star Wars, Ben 10, and every 
other science fiction adventure predicated on encounters with alien intelligence. 
It also keeps the good people of SETI in their jobs. In other words, traditional 
functionalism provides a principled basis for concluding that creatures whose 
brains happen to be built out of physical stuff different from our own may still 
be cognizers. It achieves this heady feat because it bequeaths to the mind the 
chauvinism-busting property of multiple realizability. To explain: if psychological 
phenomena are constituted by their causal-functional roles, then our terms for 
mental states, mental processes, and so on pick out equivalence classes of 
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different material substrates, any one of which might in principle realize the 
type-identified state or process in question. But of course that means that robots, 
Martians and the Ood and may all join us in having mental states, just so long as 
the physical stuff out of which they are made is capable of being organized so as 
to implement the right functional profiles. 
 
What has this brief excursion into the history of philosophy got to do with ExC?  
The answer, I suggest, is that one of the standard considerations used in pro-
ExC arguments, namely the parity principle, forges a strong connection between 
functionalism and ExC. To remind us of the parity principle, here is a much-
quoted passage from Clark and Chalmers (1998, p.8). “If, as we confront some 
task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we 
would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then 
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive 
processes ain't (all) in the head.” In broad terms, then, the parity principle states 
that if there is functional equality with respect to governing behaviour, between 
the causal contribution of certain internal elements and the causal contribution 
of certain external elements, and if the internal elements concerned qualify as 
the proper parts of a cognitive trait, then there is no good reason to deny 
equivalent status – that is, cognitive status – to the relevant external elements. 
Parity of causal contribution mandates parity of status with respect to inclusion 
in the domain of the cognitive.5  
 
So what? The parity principle is based on the thought that it is possible for the 
very same type-identified cognitive state or process to be available in two 
different generic formats – one non-extended and one extended. Thus, in 
principle at least, that state or process must be realizable in either a purely 
organic medium or in one that involves an integrated combination of organic 
and non-organic structures. In other words, it must be multiply realizable. So, if 
we are to argue for cognitive extension by way of parity considerations, the idea 
that cognitive states and processes are multiply realizable must make sense. 
Now, as we have seen, functionalism provides one well-established platform for 
securing multiple realizability. That said, we don’t quite have a case of plug and 
play philosophy here. Functionalism – or rather how we formulate it – needs to 
be tweaked a little before current needs are met. To see why recall that, 
according to the traditional formulation of the position as given earlier, a mental 
state is constituted by the causal relations that it bears to sensory inputs, 
behavioural outputs, and other mental states. But depending on how one hears 
terms like ‘sensory inputs’ and ‘behavioural outputs’, this statement of the view 
may harbour a bias towards the inner that isn’t, at root, a feature of its defining 
 5 
commitments. Fundamentally, the functionalist holds that what makes a 
systemic state a mental state is the set of causal relations that it bears to systemic 
inputs, systemic outputs, and other systemic states (cf. the formulation given by 
Levin 2008, as quoted near the beginning of this paper). Once we give this more 
general characterization of the functionalist line, we can allow the borders of the 
cognitive system to fall somewhere other than the sensory-motor interface of the 
organic body. And that opens the door to a cognitive system whose boundaries 
are located partly outside the skin. It is in this way that we arrive 
straightforwardly at the position that, following Clark, I shall call extended 
functionalism (Clark 2008, forthcoming; see also Wheeler forthcoming). I think 
that extended functionalism is an attractive position with good philosophical 
and cognitive-scientific credentials. Not everyone agrees.  
 
 
4. Troubles for Extended Functionalism Part I: the Adams-Aizawa 
Distinctiveness Principle 
 
As part of their sustained critical treatment of ExC, Fred Adams and Ken 
Aizawa (2008) argue that we should expect the vehicles of cognition to be 
exclusively neuronal in character, because we should expect processes as 
distinctive as cognitive processes to be realized by correspondingly distinctive 
lower-level processes. The latter expectation is allegedly justified by the general 
principle that “[r]oughly speaking, lower-level processes should be as 
distinctive as the higher-level processes they realize” (ibid., p.68). Call this the 
Adams-Aizawa Distinctiveness Principle. As evidence for the way in which this 
principle plausibly identifies neuronal states and processes as the only vehicles 
of cognition, Adams and Aizawa point to the differences between two sets of 
lower-level vision-related processes that are instantiated on either side of a 
transduction interface positioned at the retina. Thus in the eye, prior to the 
retina (e.g. in the cornea and the lens), we find optical processes essentially 
similar to those present in non-organic optical machinery. When light enters the 
retina, however, there is a shift to molecular processes that, among other things, 
result in the colour-sensitive, orientation-sensitive and motion-sensitive 
selective release of neurotransmitters. According to Adams and Aizawa, this 
transition in lower-level processes also marks a transition from the noncognitive 
to the cognitive.  
 
It is at this point that a critical engagement with functionalism ensues. Adams 
and Aizawa write: “Functionalists about cognition might… observe that, in 
principle, anything could be organized in such a way as to give rise to cognitive 
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processing. But our point is that, even though many things could, in principle, be 
organized to form a cognitive processor, it is reasonable to conjecture that only 
neuronal processes are in fact so organized” (ibid., p.69). As far as I can tell, the 
specific language of ‘processes’ is not essential to Adams and Aizawa’s point, 
which ultimately concerns the distinctiveness of a range of relevant phenomena 
(including for example states and mechanisms, as well as processes) at the 
different levels. With that clarification in place, we can see that Adams and 
Aizawa’s argument implies a rejection of the general claim that human 
cognitive traits are sometimes multiply realized. To be clear: Adams and 
Aizawa do not reject the in-principle possibility of cognition-realizing substrates 
that involve (wholly or partly) non-neuronal elements. What they reject is the 
idea that minds like ours are in fact ever realized by such substrates. Understood 
as part of their general critique of cognitive extension, now interpreted in terms 
of extended functionalism, their argument is thus levelled not against the in-
principle possibility of cognitive extension, but against the idea that minds like 
ours are in fact ever extended. In view of all this, one defensive strategy open to 
the ExC theorist would be to find examples of scientifically well-established 
cases which show that the Adams-Aizawa distinctiveness principle is false. If 
there are extant distinctive higher-level phenomena, such that each of those 
phenomena is, in fact, multiply realized by more than one kind of lower-level 
phenomenon, then we would have no general reason to expect each distinctive 
higher-level phenomenon to be realized exclusively in a single material 
substrate, and thus no general reason to expect cognition in particular to be 
realized exclusively in a neuronal substrate.  
 
As it happens, it seems that the evidence needed by the ExC theorist is plentiful, 
in examples of what is known in biology as functional convergence in evolution. 
Convergent evolution is a widespread phenomenon in which a particular 
biological trait evolves independently in more than one lineage, from different 
ancestors. One kind of convergent evolution involves functional convergence 
(Doolittle 1994), a process in which two or more biological entities perform the 
same function, but do so by way of entirely different underlying structures and 
mechanisms. Here is an example of functional convergence in molecular 
evolution. Alcohol dehydrogenases are enzymes that, in humans and many 
other animals, break down alcohols that might otherwise be dangerous. They 
figure in the molecular economies of vertebrates and fruit-flies, and perform 
functionally equivalent roles in each of these biological contexts, but the 
vertebrate enzymes and the fruit-fly enzymes display no sequence similarity 
with each other, have fundamentally different tertiary structures, and catalyze 
alcohol into acetaldehyde using different chemical reactions (Doolittle 1994). 
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This is just one example of a distinctive higher-level phenomenon (relatively 
speaking) that is multiply realized. The Adams-Aizawa distinctiveness principle 
is false. Extended functionalist minds may yet be actual. 
   
 
5. Troubles for Extended Functionalism Part II: the Rowlands Deadlock  
 
A second analysis that, in a different way, questions the ability of extended 
functionalism to deliver cognitive extension hails from Mark Rowlands 
(manuscript). According to Rowlands, if one reflects on the interplay between (i) 
an argument against parity-driven ExC developed by Rob Rupert (2004; for 
related considerations see Adams and Aizawa 2008) and (ii) a way of 
responding to Rupert’s argument that I have been known to pursue (Wheeler 
forthcoming), what emerges is a deadlock between the two sides, the paralyzing 
character of which may be traced to the functionalist terms of the debate. In 
what follows I shall lay down a path that leads to this stalemate, a path that 
adds detail to Rowlands’ own analysis, but which ends up at the same 
unfortunate (for ExC) point. Let’s begin, then, by revisiting Rupert’s argument 
against ExC and what might be wrong with it.        
 
Rupert calls on empirical psychological data which, he argues, may be used to 
indicate significant differences between the profile of internal memory and the 
profile of certain external resources, as such external resources might plausibly 
figure in the process of remembering. According to Rupert, such differences tell 
against any attempt to see the latter phenomena as being of the same 
explanatory kind as the former. For example, there are psychological 
experiments which show that internal memory is sensitive to what is called the 
generation effect. Where this effect is in evidence, subjects gain a mnemonic 
advantage by generating their own meaningful connections between paired 
associate items be learned.  Rupert argues that the generation effect will simply 
not occur in some extended ‘memory’ systems (e.g., in a system according to 
which, during recall, the subject refers to a notebook in which the paired 
associates are accompanied by connection sentences produced by those subjects 
during learning, but which were entered into the notebook by the 
experimenter). He concedes that it might occur in others (e.g., in a system 
according to which, during recall, the subject refers to a notebook in which the 
paired associates to be learned are accompanied by connection sentences 
produced and entered by the subjects during learning). In the latter case, 
however, he suggests that the effect is an accidental feature, rather than an 
essential or definitional dimension, of the memory system. Rupert concludes 
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that the processes involved in putative cases of extended memory differ in such 
fundamental ways from those involved in cases of ordinary internal memory 
that the extended cases cannot count as cognitive.  The final step is to generalize 
from this conclusion about memory to a conclusion about all cognitive traits. As 
Rupert points out, this step is plausibly justified by the fact that memory is a 
core cognitive trait, suggesting that what goes for memory goes for cognition in 
general. 6  
 
Rupert’s argument has the following form: first we identify certain features of 
some core cognitive trait as standardly (internally) conceived that are not shared 
(or not shared in the ‘right’ way) by any extended arrangement that might be 
thought to perform the same cognitive task; then we conclude that since the 
parity principle is not satisfied, ExC is false. But once this two-part structure is 
exposed, the parity-driven ExC theorist will want to lodge a complaint (Wheeler 
forthcoming). For although in general that theorist must concede the existence 
of the kinds of functional differences identified by Rupert, she will want to 
object to the further claim that such differences result in a breakdown of parity. 
What allows the ExC theorist to block this further claim is the fact that it 
depends on a seemingly contestable assumption that the benchmark for parity 
(in effect, what counts as cognitive) should be set by the extant fine-grained 
details of the human inner. It is only because these details are being allowed to 
call the cognitive shots that the divergent functional profiles exhibited by the 
extended systems in question mandate the judgment that those systems should 
be denied cognitive status. However, when properly understood, the parity 
principle does not privilege the organization and processing of the actual 
human inner in the way that Rupert’s argument suggests. Full discussion of this 
issue would take us too far afield (for an extended treatment, see Wheeler 
manuscript). But, in somewhat sketchy and general terms, here is a way of 
unpacking the appeal to parity so that ExC is insulated against Rupert’s 
concerns. First we give an account of what it is to be a proper part of a cognitive 
system that is fundamentally independent of where any candidate element 
happens to be spatially located. Then we look to see where cognition falls – in 
the brain, in the non-neural body, in the environment, or, as the ExC theorist 
predicts may sometimes be the case, in a system that extends across all of these 
aspects of the world. On this model, parity is conceived not as parity with the 
inner simpliciter, but rather as parity with the inner with respect to a locationally 
uncommitted account of the cognitive. Although I am no legal philosopher, it seems 
to me that this way of understanding the notion of parity in cognitive theory has 
a recognizable and illuminating (although arguably slightly strained) analogue 
in the way that two citizens of a democratic state may be understood as having 
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the right to equality of treatment under the law. Ignoring cases of precedence, 
what counts as the correct treatment under the law is presumably not fixed by 
the case of one of the parity-enjoying citizens. Rather, each of the two citizens 
enjoys parity with the other with respect to an independently fixed standard of 
correct legal treatment.7  
 
At this point one might wonder what remains of Clark and Chalmers’ original 
idea that, in applying the parity principle, we should ask of some external 
process that plays a part in governing behaviour, ‘Were this process done in the 
head, would we have any hesitation in recognizing it as part of a cognitive 
process?’. The first thing to note here is that the appeal to the inner contained in 
this method for reaching a judgment regarding parity is not an appeal to the 
fine-grained profile of the extant human inner. All that happens in the thought 
experiment is this: certain external processes get shifted spatially, across the 
boundary of the skin, in an inwardly moving direction. Of course, we are not 
supposed to imagine that the relevant externally located physical elements 
themselves are grafted onto the brain. Rather, we imagine that exactly the same 
functional states and processes that are realized in the actual world by those 
externally located physical elements are now realized by certain internally 
located physical elements. Having done this, if we then judge that the now-
internal but previously external processes count as part of a genuinely cognitive 
system, we are driven to conclude that they did so in the extended case too. 
After all, by hypothesis, nothing about the functional contribution of those 
processes to intelligent behaviour has changed. All that has been varied is their 
spatial location. And if one were to claim that that spatial shift alone is sufficient 
to result in a transition in the status of the external elements in question, from 
noncognitive to cognitive, one would, it seems, be guilty of begging the question 
against the ExC theorist. Now notice that at no point in this explanation of how 
the appeal to the inner contained in the parity principle works have we been 
forced to use the fine-grained profile of the extant human inner in order to 
determine what counts as cognitive. In other words, the application of the parity 
principle does not itself set the benchmark for parity (fix what counts as 
cognitive). Instead it acts as a heuristic device designed to free us from what 
Clark (2007, p.167) has called “the pervasive distractions of skin and skull”.  
 
Of course, given the stress that the foregoing analysis places on functional role 
in judgments of cognitive status, one thing that this initial response to Rupert 
does is re-emphasize the connection between functionalism and ExC, at least 
where the latter is played out by way of parity considerations. Indeed, if the 
critic of ExC refused to endorse a broadly functionalist theory of mind, the 
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aforementioned charge of question-begging would arguably lose some of its 
force. Without functionalism to sustain the multiple realizability of the mental, 
conceptual space would remain for the claim that cognitive states and processes 
are somehow intrinsically related to the materiality of the target system in such 
a way that multiple realizability fails. Given a failure of multiple realizability, 
the imagined inward shift across the boundary of the skin would presumably 
have an impact on whether the processes in question were cognitive or 
noncognitive in character, even if the external factors in the extended case and 
the relevant inner factors in the wholly inner case enjoyed functional 
equivalence with respect to governing intelligent behaviour. This observation 
points to an under-appreciated and under-explored tension between extended 
functionalism and any embodied cognition view which holds that human 
thought and experience are tied inextricably to the details of human bodily 
form. Given the goals of the present analysis, however, this particular conflict 
will not detain us here. (For preliminary investigations of the issue, see Clark 
2008, forthcoming; Wheeler forthcoming.) Our concern is with a deadlock that, 
as we are about to see, emerges within a broadly functionalist framework, 
between extended and non-extended versions of that view.   
 
What the Rupert-style critic of ExC needs to unearth is independent support for 
the key assumption that the benchmark for parity should be set by the extant 
fine-grained details of the human inner. It might be thought that Rupert himself 
has the resources to marshal such support, given that his appeal to the inner is 
supposed to be founded not on some pro-inner prejudice or some unwarranted 
theoretical conservatism, but rather on a healthy and entirely defensible respect 
for the methods and results of contemporary cognitive science. Thus he writes: 
“[a]s cognitive science currently describes its explanatory kinds, they are not 
likely to have realizations with external components. If, for example, cognitive 
science is to characterize functionally the causal role of memories, this 
characterization must be tailored to accommodate the generation-effect, various 
forms of interference, the power laws of learning and forgetting and the rest” 
(Rupert 2004, pp.423-4; for similar reasoning, see Adams and Aizawa 2008, 
pp.140-1). Two aspects of this short quotation are crucial. The first is that Rupert 
takes current cognitive science to be a broadly functionalist enterprise (its job 
being to “characterize functionally” psychological phenomena). The second is 
that, by ‘cognitive science’, Rupert means conventional  human-oriented and inner-
oriented cognitive psychology (note the list of psychological phenomena that 
Rupert gives at the end of his quotation). What this tells us is that the 
justification for the assumption that the benchmark for parity should be set by 
the extant fine-grained details of the inner comes from the idea that what counts 
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as cognitive should be fixed by the details of the functional organization of 
human cognition, as identified by conventional human-oriented and inner-
oriented cognitive psychology. In effect, then, Rupert is arguing for a 
chauvinistic form of functionalism that privileges the scientifically identified 
human-specific inner. But the extended functionalist is unlikely to be moved by 
this extra consideration. Why, she will ask, should we privilege conventional 
human-oriented and inner-oriented cognitive psychology in this way? Indeed, it 
seems that Rupert’s more developed argument continues to beg the question 
against extended functionalism. For, as we have seen, extended functionalism 
looks to be predicated on the more liberal form of functionalism that generates a 
locationally uncommitted account of the cognitive.  
 
It is at this point in the exchange of argument and counter-argument that the 
problem highlighted by Rowlands emerges. Here it is, in Rowlands’ own words:  
 
This charge [that Rupert’s objections are question-begging] has been 
leveled by Wheeler ([forthcoming]). However, this charge seems to 
cut both ways. If Rupert’s arguments against the extended mind are 
question-begging because they presuppose a chauvinistic form of 
functionalism, it is difficult to see why arguments for the extended 
mind are not question-begging given their predication on a liberal 
form of functionalism. Adjudicating between the extended mind and 
its critics, therefore, seems to require adjudicating between liberal 
and chauvinistic forms of functionalism. But this is a dispute that has 
been ongoing almost since functionalism’s inception. In the absence 
of any satisfactory resolution of this dispute, the clear danger for the 
extended mind is one of stalemate. (Rowlands manuscript, pp.6-7) 
 
If this problem is genuine, it spells bad news for extended functionalism. For if 
Rowlands is right, then to the extent that ExC is allied to functionalism, the best 
it can achieve against its critics is a stalemate. This is what I shall call the 
Rowlands deadlock.  
 
Is there a way out of the impasse – one that ultimately finds in favour of ExC?  
Perhaps there is. Imagine we came across a human being whose purely inner 
memory system didn’t exhibit the generation effect, but who nevertheless 
continued to achieve the context-sensitive selective storage and retrieval of 
information. I for one have no doubt at all that conventional human-oriented 
cognitive psychologists would find the functional difference between this 
generation-effect-free subject and normal human subjects extremely interesting, 
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and that those same psychologists would use their well-honed experimental 
protocols to probe and explain that difference. But I cannot conceive of any 
cognitive psychologist concluding that the latter subject lacks the cognitive trait 
of memory. So why think that exhibiting the generation effect is a defining 
feature of (human) memory, rather than an accidental feature? And if that’s 
right, then what is the justification (aside from pro-inner prejudice and 
unwarranted conservatism) for refusing to apply the notion of memory to an 
extended system with a similar profile to our generation-effect-free subject? The 
fact that the answers to these questions are ‘one shouldn’t’ and ‘there isn’t one’ 
gives us good reason to think that the difference between exhibiting or failing to 
exhibit the generation effect (in the right sort of way) doesn’t mark the 
boundary between having a memory and not having one, which further 
suggests that there must be an explanatorily useful, generic account of memory 
that is broad enough to cover generation-effect and non-generation-effect cases. 
That account will be apt to encompass, within the category of memory, 
extended mechanisms for context-sensitive information storage and retrieval 
that don’t exhibit the generation effect. So although Rupert may conceivably be 
right that for two creatures to realize the cognitive trait of exhibiting the 
generation effect in memory, they will need to share a fine-grained inner profile 
which resists any extended realization, that fact, if it is one, poses no real threat 
to ExC. Extended systems of context-sensitive information storage and retrieval 
that fail to exhibit the generation effect might still count as memory, and thus as 
cognitive.  
 
It is clear enough that this result is not restricted to memory. Similar arguments 
could be developed for prediction systems that don’t fall for the gambler’s 
fallacy, inference systems that don’t exhibit the patterns characteristically 
revealed by the Wason selection task, and so on. What our reflections suggest, 
then, is a general principle: just because some specified mode of functional 
organization happens to be of interest to cognitive psychologists, one cannot 
infer that the difference between exhibiting that mode of organization and not 
exhibiting it must in some way play a decisive role in marking off the cognitive 
from the noncognitive. As the case of the generation-effect-free subject indicates, 
such functional differences – differences that cognitive psychologists will surely 
want to investigate – may well be differences within the domain of the cognitive. 
The message here is not, of course, that no mode of functional organization that 
ever interested a cognitive psychologist could ever be relevant to the issue of 
how to determine membership of the cognitive. A mechanism that failed to 
implement the context-sensitive storage and retrieval of information simply 
wouldn’t be memory, wherever it happened to be located. The message, rather, 
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is that working out whether or not a particular mode of functional organization 
matters to this issue will not be decided by the fact that orthodox cognitive 
psychologists have studied systems that exhibit it.   
 
If we place the preceding analysis in the explicitly functionalist context that 
apparently generates the Rowlands deadlock, its lesson is that the difference 
between exhibiting or failing to exhibit fine-grained functional traits (like the 
generation effect) doesn’t mark the boundary between being a cognizer and not 
being one. Rather, the level of functional grain that matters for the presence or 
absence of cognition must be set high enough so that, other things being equal, a 
system that exhibits some fine-grained functional trait and one that doesn’t both 
count as cognitive. (For additional considerations which point in the same 
direction, see Sprevak manuscript, especially p.11. More from Sprevak in a 
moment.) In the end, then, it looks as if the Rowlands deadlock may be broken, 
on the grounds that we have ExC-independent reasons for rejecting the fine-
grained, chauvinistic form of functionalism assumed by Rupert, in favour of a 
higher-level, liberal grain of functional analysis. Such a state of affairs paves the 
way for extended functionalism.       
 
At this juncture it might seem that the Rowlands deadlock is lurking just out of 
sight, waiting impatiently to reappear. For although I have just offered reasons, 
independent of ExC, for rejecting chauvinistic functionalism in favour of liberal 
functionalism, so the critic of ExC might offer reasons, independent of any case 
against ExC, for rejecting liberal functionalism in favour of chauvinistic 
functionalism. For example, the critic might claim that any attempt to fix a 
generic functional notion of, for example, memory, one that would subsume all 
the relevant internal and extended systems (those that don’t exhibit the 
generation effect, those that do, those that don’t exhibit negative transfer 
interference effects [see note 6], those that do, and so on) would need to be so 
devoid of detail (in order to subsume all the different functional profiles) that it 
would fail to earn its explanatory keep (for this sort of argument, see, e.g., 
Rupert 2004). In short, the charge is that our more liberal form of functionalism 
is pitched at such a stratospheric level of generality that it fails to support useful 
psychological theorizing. And that provides a reason to favour chauvinistic 
functionalism. But now if there are not only appropriate and defensible reasons 
for adopting ExC-friendly liberal functionalism, but also equally appropriate 
and equally defensible reasons for adopting ExC-unfriendly chauvinistic 
functionalism, then the Rowlands deadlock is restored.  
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Once again, however, I think the stalemate can be broken. Recall yet again our 
hypothetical subject whose inner mechanisms of context-sensitive information 
storage and retrieval do not exhibit the generation effect. As we have seen, the 
fact that neither commonsense nor cognitive psychology baulks at the thought 
that this subject’s feats should count as genuine cases of remembering gives us 
good reason to think that there must be a generic notion of what memory is that 
is broad enough to cover generation-effect and non-generation-effect cases. Now 
we can add a further observation. The fact that our subject’s abilities would 
undoubtedly be investigated by cognitive psychologists as one possible form of 
the psychological phenomenon of memory surely indicates that the generic 
notion of memory that underwrites this way of proceeding is doing important 
work in organizing and shaping the project of cognitive-scientific explanation. 
Thus, on the strength of this example, it seems that the explanatory credentials 
of that generic notion of memory are in perfectly good order. And that is good 
news for the liberal version of functionalism that provides the theoretical 
backdrop against which that generic notion of memory makes sense. For it 
surely suggests, pace the critic of ExC, that that liberal, ExC-friendly version of 
functionalism is not stymied by explanatory impotence. If this is right, then the 
restored form of the Rowlands deadlock is ultimately unsustainable.      
 
 
6. Interlude: Extended Microfunctionalism 
 
So far I have been running with the thought that extended functionalism is 
naturally predicated on a liberal version of functionalism. Part of the supporting 
argument has involved the claim that the cognitive-noncognitive boundary does 
not coincide with the sorts of fine-grained functional differences exemplified by 
the difference between exhibiting or not exhibiting the generation effect. But this 
is not the whole story. For in spite of what I have argued so far, the fact is that 
the cognitive-noncognitive boundary may sometimes (although not in the 
generation-effect case) be determined by fine-grained functional differences. 
Here is some evidence for this conclusion. It is at least arguable that any 
architecture deserving of the title ‘cognitive’ will need to display capacities such 
as flexible (i.e. context-sensitive) generalization and the graceful degradation of 
performance in the face of restricted damage or noisy/inaccurate input 
information. Such capacities are plausibly at work in the entire suite of cognitive 
activities, from online perceptually guided action to offline reflection and 
reason. So how do we explain them? To reveal part of the answer to this 
question, recall that one major impetus to the rebirth of connectionist artificial 
intelligence (AI) in the 1980s was that while capacities such as flexible 
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generalization and graceful degradation are often missing from, or difficult to 
achieve in, classical AI systems, connectionist networks seem to exhibit them as 
‘natural’ by-products of their basic mode of organization. So what explains this 
propensity? It has frequently been noted (perhaps most famously by Smolensky 
1988) that the cognitively relevant functions implemented by connectionist 
networks will often be specified in terms of mathematical relations (between 
units) that do not respect the boundaries of linguistic or conceptual thought. 
Given the tendency (it is far from a universal commitment) of classical AI 
theorizing to adopt functional specifications that do respect the boundaries of 
linguistic or conceptual thought, one might gloss this point by saying that the 
salient functional roles that matter for connectionist theorizing are typically 
pitched a finer level of grain than those performed by classical computational 
systems. That’s part of the reason why Clark (1989, 1999) has described 
connectionist  theory as a kind of microfunctionalism. Moreover, it is highly 
plausible that cognitively critical properties such as flexible generalization and 
graceful degradation may be emergent properties of connectionist networks in 
part precisely because those networks are functionally organized in a fine-
grained way. As Clark (1989, pp.35-6) puts it 
 
[Microfunctionalism] would describe at least the internal functional 
profile of the system (the internal state transitions) in terms far 
removed from.. contentful purposive characterizations. It would 
delineate formal (probably mathematical) relations between 
processing units in a way that when those mathematical relations 
obtain, the system will be capable of vast, flexible structural 
variability and will have the attendant emergent properties. By 
keeping the formal characterization… at this fine-grained level we 
may hope to guarantee that any instantiation of such a description 
provides at least potentially the right kind of substructure to support 
the kind of flexible, rich behavior patterns required for true 
understanding. 
 
This provides evidence for the following claim: for some properties that, 
one might argue, would need to be displayed by any system worthy of the 
label ‘cognitive’, the fact that the system realizes a certain fine-grained 
functional profile may well be crucial to the possession of that property.  
 
Of course, if it were the case that the sorts of fine-grained functional roles just 
highlighted could only be implemented internally, then this would present a 
serious barrier to extended functionalism. The good news for the extended 
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functionalist, however, is that microfunctionalism is not antithetical to the 
possibility of extended realizations. Significantly, as Clark (1999, p.40) notes, 
microfunctionalist connectionism “specifies a system only in terms of input-
output profiles for individual units and thus is not crucially dependent on any 
particular biological substrate”. This preservation of the functionalist 
commitment to multiple realizability clears the way not only to non-standard 
organic implementations of the microfunctions in question, as Clark’s text here 
directly suggests, but also to extended implementations. In this context, notice 
that, in the longer quotation from Clark reproduced just above, he states that “at 
least the internal functional profile of the system would be described in 
microfunctionalist terms” [first emphasis mine]. In my view this way of putting 
the point is too conservative. There is every reason to believe that at least some 
microfunctions will be apt for realization in extended substrates. Thus imagine 
that I possess a mobile computing device armed with connectionist software 
capable of the sort of flexible generalization and graceful degradation 
characteristic of such systems. And let’s assume, just for the sake or argument, 
that the computing device contributes to my behaviour in such a way that, on 
the strength of parity-principle reasoning, we are happy to include it as part of 
my cognitive systems. In this case, the microfunctions that underlie the key 
properties of flexible generalization and graceful degradation are at least partly 
realized beyond the skin.  
 
What this indicates is that, in the end, the question of the grain at which 
functional analysis should be performed is pretty much orthogonal to the issue 
of cognitive extension. In other words, the situation is not that for ExC to be 
true, all cognitive traits would need to be specified at a high level of grain, 
meaning that the ExC theorist assumes a liberal form of functionalism, while for 
ExC to be false, all cognitive traits would need to be specified at a fine level of 
grain, meaning that the opponent of ExC assumes a chauvinistic form of 
functionalism. Indeed, it is entirely possible that some of the functional roles that 
will be identified by a locationally uncommitted cognitive science as 
determinative of cognition will be fixed at a fine level of grain. The implication – 
one that enriches our vision of ExC – is that extended functionalism has a 
robustly microfunctionalist dimension. 
 
  
7. Troubles for Extended Functionalism Part III: the Sprevak Dilemma   
 
Our third argument against extended functionalism is due to Mark Sprevak 
(manuscript). Although this argument shares certain features with the 
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considerations that generate the Rowlands deadlock, it demands attention in its 
own right. At its heart is an independently plausible principle that Sprevak calls 
the Martian intuition.   
 
The Martian intuition is that it is possible for a creature with mental 
states to exist even if such a creature has a different physical and 
biological makeup from ourselves. An intelligent organism might 
have green slime instead of neurons, and it might have different 
kinds of connections in its “nervous” system. The Martian intuition 
applies to fine-grained psychology as well as physiology: there is no 
reason why a Martian should have exactly the same fine-grained 
psychology as ours. A Martian’s pain response may not decay in 
exactly the same way as ours; its learning profiles and reaction times 
may not exactly match ours; the typical causes and effects of its 
mental states may not be exactly the same as ours; even the large-
scale functional relationships between the Martian’s cognitive 
systems (e.g. between its memory and perception) may not exactly 
match ours. (Sprevak manuscript, pp.5-6) 
 
As indicated by our previous discussion of the place of functionalism in the 
history of philosophy of mind, one of the key properties of that thesis (as 
traditionally conceived) is that it gives us the conceptual resources to save the 
Martian intuition. However, Sprevak argues that it can achieve this only if the 
level of functional grain is set at a sufficiently coarse level. If the level of 
functional grain is set too finely, Martians whose pain responses decayed 
differently to ours or whose learning profiles and reaction times did not exactly 
match ours would be illegitimately excluded from being cognizers, and the 
Martian intuition would be violated. So how does the Martian intuition bear on 
the case for cognitive extension? Sprevak’s claim (ibid. p.8) is that “if the grain 
parameter is set at least coarse enough to allow for intelligent Martians, then it 
also allows many cases of extended cognition”. Why think this? As Sprevak 
explains (partially echoing an argument from Clark this volume b), if we take 
some putative case of extended cognition, we can always imagine a functionally 
equivalent system that is located entirely inside the head of a Martian. On the 
strength of the Martian intuition, we would count that Martian-internal system 
as cognitive, so when, as functionalists, we fix the level of grain for our analysis, 
it must be set coarsely enough to generate that result. But if it is that coarse, then 
the (by hypothesis) functionally identical extended system too will count as 
cognitive. Or at least it will do so, if we accept the parity principle. For of course 
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it would be inner chauvinism to exclude the extended system simply because it 
involves external factors, when in all other relevant respects it is equivalent.    
 
It is at this point that the trouble for extended functionalism starts. For Sprevak 
argues that once the level of functional grain is set coarsely enough to save the 
Martian intuition, what is entailed is a radical form of ExC that is wildly over-
permissive, because it will welcome in to the domain of the cognitive certain 
unwanted interlopers. For example, Sprevak argues that, according to this form 
of ExC, if I have a desktop computer which contains a program for calculating 
the dates of the Mayan calendar 5,000 years into the future, then, even if I never 
run this program, I possess an extended cognitive process that is capable of 
calculating the dates of the Mayan calendar. Why? Because one could imagine a 
Martian with an internal process that is capable of calculating the dates of the 
Mayan calendar using the same algorithm as my desktop computer. Even if the 
Martian never has cause to use this process, nevertheless it seems right to say 
that it is part of that creature’s cognitive architecture. Now we simply apply the 
parity principle: there is functional equality between the dispositional 
contribution of the Martian’s inner process to the Martian’s behavioural 
repertoire and the dispositional contribution of the external desktop process to 
my behavioural repertoire. Since the Martian’s inner process counts as cognitive, 
equal treatment demands that the same status be granted to the process in my 
desktop computer. And intuitively that seems wrong. Surely the desktop process 
is a potential aid to cognition, but is not itself part of my cognitive architecture.  
 
This is bad news for extended functionalism, since if Sprevak is right, 
functionalism entails a wildly over-permissive form of ExC that looks to be false. 
But it is also bad news for functionalism as a theory of mind, since if 
functionalism entails a false theory, then functionalism too is false. Of course, the 
critical argument could be blocked if we gave up on the Martian intuition, since 
then, to return to Sprevak’s Mayan Calendar example, the Martian inner process 
wouldn’t count as cognitive. But that is ruled out because the Martian intuition is 
independently plausible. Alternatively, the critical argument could be blocked if 
we gave up on the parity principle, since then we could count the Martian inner 
process as cognitive, while denying that status to the desktop process. But that is 
ruled out because the parity principle is one of the keystones of the case for ExC  
(Sprevak manuscript, p.16). So it seems that Sprevak has created a serious 
dilemma for the extended functionalist who favours a parity-driven case for ExC. 
 
Or has he? Let’s look again at the structure of Sprevak’s argument. The 
conceptual backdrop against which it operates involves three factors: a 
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functionalist understanding of ExC, the independent plausibility of the Martian 
intuition, and the centrality of the parity principle to the positive case for ExC. 
The path to the apparently troublesome dilemma then has four steps. At step 1 
Sprevak describes an example of distributed (over brain, body and world) 
problem-solving that intuitively looks to be wildly unlikely candidate for a case 
of extended cognition, so unlikely in fact that any theory according to which the 
external parts of that system counted as cognitive would, by virtue of that fact, 
look to be false. At step 2 he imagines a functionally identical system located 
entirely inside the head of a Martian, and concludes, on the grounds of a 
functionalism committed to the Martian intuition, that we would grant that 
system cognitive status and thus that the level of functional grain should be set 
coarsely enough to deliver that result. At step 3 he argues, on the strength of the 
parity principle, that the entire distributed system described at step 1 must also 
count as cognitive. At step 4 he draws the anti-ExC and anti-functionalist 
conclusions. It’s compelling stuff. So what has gone wrong?  
 
It seems that step 2 of Sprevak’s argument depends on a form of the Martian 
intuition that is significantly more radical than the one he explicitly formulates as 
part of his conceptual backdrop. And whereas the latter intuition does indeed 
command considerable plausibility, the former doesn’t. To explain: What 
Sprevak does at step 2 is take what he assumes to be the noncognitive, externally 
located elements in a distributed process, place them inside the head of a 
Martian, and conclude that they now deserve to be rewarded with cognitive 
status. But where is the justification for suddenly counting these elements as 
themselves cognitive? Apart from their spatial location, nothing about them has 
changed from when they were judged to be noncognitive. The only new factor is 
their recently acquired in-the-head-ness. So it certainly looks as if an external 
element that we took to be noncognitive has since become cognitive, purely in 
virtue of being moved inside the head. Now, the core of the Martian intuition, as 
explicitly formulated by Sprevak, is that “it is possible for a creature with mental 
states to exist even if such a creature has a different physical and biological 
makeup from ourselves”. But it certainly doesn’t follow from this highly 
plausible principle that any state or process that happens to be found inside the 
head of an intelligent Martian must, simply because of its in-the-head-ness, count 
as a cognitive state or process. The latter claim, which is what Sprevak seems to 
need for his anti-ExC argument, would constitute a significantly more radical 
form of the Martian intuition. Moreover, it is one that clashes unhelpfully with 
the parity principle that Sprevak assumes at step 3 of his argument. Indeed, it is a 
corollary of the parity principle that the smuggled-in, more radical form of the 
Martian intuition cannot be right. After all, the parity principle implies that an in-
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the-head element that we take to be cognitive doesn’t become noncognitive 
purely in virtue of being moved outside the skin. And the direction of travel here 
is irrelevant. The more general slogan is equal treatment regardless of location. Thus 
the parity principle also implies that an external element that we take to be 
noncognitive doesn’t become cognitive purely in virtue of being shifted inside the 
head.  
 
What this suggests is that the extended functionalist can avoid the Sprevak 
dilemma by refusing to endorse the more radical form of the Martian intuition. 
This is something that the fan of the parity-driven case for cognitive extension 
ought to do anyway, given that the parity principle is inconsistent with that 
version of the intuition. The orthodox version, the one explicitly stated by 
Sprevak, remains in force, of course. But that is consistent with the claim that the 
class of Martian in-the-head elements (indeed, the class of in-the-head elements 
in general) may contain some noncognitive members. Thus it does not entail that 
where the causal contribution to intelligent behaviour of certain in-the-head 
elements is functionally identical to that of certain noncognitive external 
elements, the former elements attain cognitive status purely in virtue of being 
intra-cranial. The orthodox version of the Martian intuition is also fully 
compatible with the parity principle. The path to the Sprevak dilemma is thus 
blocked, at step 2.  
 
It is worth noting that the missing piece of the jigsaw here is some sort of 
locationally independent account of the cognitive that fixes the benchmark for 
parity (see section 5 above). Once such an account is part of our conceptual 
picture, there is no reason at all to think that any old process will count as 
cognitive, just because it has been rammed inside the head of a Martian. The 
resulting benchmark for parity does sterling theoretical work in weeding out 
unwanted interlopers into the domain of the cognitive, wherever they happen to 
be spatially located. 8     
 
 
8. A Loose Ending 
 
In this paper I have argued that it is possible to defend the thesis of extended 
functionalism against some seemingly powerful objections. But perhaps this 
result, as encouraging as it is for the prospects of extended cognition, provides 
no grounds for a triumphant concluding flourish. It is common knowledge that 
functionalism as a general theory of mind faces some demoralizing philosophical 
challenges (for a nice review, see Levin 2008). Perhaps the more daunting of 
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these challenges are connected with phenomenal consciousness – the what it’s-
like-ness of experience. Who can forget evergreen thought experiments such as 
the single system comprising the entire Chinese nation, organized so as to 
satisfy the functional definition of a mind (Block 1980), or the functionally-
identical-to-one-of-us zombie (Chalmers 1996). In such cases the message is 
supposed to be that since we enjoy phenomenal consciousness, yet certain 
systems functionally identical to us plausibly don’t, no purely functional 
characterization can explain phenomenal consciousness. Given the thought that 
phenomenal consciousness is central to mindedness, or at least to any 
mindedness interestingly similar to human mindedness, this looks like a serious 
limitation on any functionalist theory of mind, including of course extended 
functionalism. Extended functionalism inherits the disadvantages, as well as the 
advantages, of its parent theory. 
 
A proper treatment of this issue must wait for another day. I simply want to 
bring the present discussion to a close by pointing out one thing. It is of course 
true that, to the extent that there exists a gap between functionalist explanation 
and an understanding of phenomenal consciousness, that gap is in force 
whether the realizing vehicles are wholly neural, a combination of neural and 
non-neural bodily factors, or an extended matrix of elements in the brain, the 
non-neural body, and the beyond-the-skin environment. But now notice that it’s 
the functional basis of the explanation that causes the alleged difficulty here, not where 
the realizing elements happen to be spatially located. So although functionalism may 
indeed struggle in the face of phenomenal consciousness, extending one’s 
functionalism certainly doesn’t make things worse than they already were. 
When the topic at hand is the perplexing and recalcitrant question of how to 
account for phenomenal consciousness naturalistically, not making things worse 
is perhaps the best for which one can hope.   
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1 What I am calling the extended cognition hypothesis (ExC) trades under a number of different 
names, including the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), active externalism 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003), 
environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), and locational externalism (Wilson 2004). 
   
2 I am sensitive to the fact that the introduction of readily available electronic calculators and 
related software applications threatens to render this empirical observation about the use of pen 
and paper false. However, no one need worry about that here, since it is arguable that, with 
minor local variations to reflect how the different items of equipment are used, the points I go 
on to make in the main text apply straightforwardly to our relationship with the newer kind of 
technology. 
 
3 For my own contribution to this process, see Wheeler 2005. See also, among many many others, 
Varela et al. 1991; Clark 1997; Nöe 2004; Thompson 2007. 
  
4 I have set things up by treating ExC as a kind of radicalization of the embodied-embedded 
view (cf. Wheeler and Clark forthcoming). This is good enough for present purposes, but, as 
suggested in section 5 below, the relationship between the two sets of positions is a complex 
issue that has yet to be explored fully in the literature. For discussion of a number of apparent 
tensions between (certain versions of) the embodied-embedded view and ExC, see Clark 2008, 
forthcoming; Wheeler forthcoming. 
 
5 Of course, not all ExC theorists think that extended cognition should be justified by way of the 
parity principle. Arguments in support of ExC that don’t exploit (and sometimes explicitly 
shun) the parity principle, are developed and defended by, e.g., Rowlands 1999, Sutton 2006, 
Menary 2007.     
 
6 Results from other psychological experiments on memory have been used in a similar way. For 
example, Rupert (2004) also appeals also to negative transfer interference effects (data which 
indicate that past learning interferes with the learning and recall of new paired associations), 
while Adams and Aizawa (2008) appeal to recency and primacy effects (data which indicate that 
we are better at recalling the elements at the beginning and end of a list than we are at recalling 
the elements in the middle). In both cases the claim is that extended systems will fail to exhibit 
the highlighted effect (or will fail to do so in the right way) and so are different in explanatory 
kind to the familiar human internal systems studied by cognitive psychologists.  
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7 Equal treatment interpretations of parity based on (what I am calling) locationally 
uncommitted accounts of the cognitive are defended by Clark (2007, forthcoming) and Wheeler 
(forthcoming, manuscript). Within the scope of this general approach, there is a further and 
crucial question concerning how to unpack the key notion of a locationally uncommitted 
account of the cognitive. Clark (this volume b, forthcoming) suggests that the domain of the 
cognitive should be determined by our intuitive folk-judgments of what counts as cognitive. His 
supporting argument is (roughly) that our intuitive understanding of the cognitive is essentially 
locationally uncommitted, while the range of mechanisms identified by cognitive science is in 
truth too much of a motley to be a scientific kind, and so will thwart any attempt to provide a 
scientifically driven, theory-loaded account of the cognitive – locationally uncommitted or 
otherwise. I disagree with this assessment. I hold out for a locationally uncommitted account of 
the cognitive that is scientifically driven and theory-loaded, on the grounds (roughly) that our 
intuitive picture of the cognitive has a deep-seated inner bias, while Clark’s argument for the 
claim that there is a fundamental mechanistic disunity in cognitive science is far from 
compelling (Wheeler, manuscript).     
 
8. In effect, I have argued that the Mayan calendar program may be denied cognitive status, even 
when it is located inside a Martian head. This allows us to preserve the intuition that the Mayan 
desktop calendar program as described is the sort of element that ought to be excluded from the 
domain of the cognitive, an intuition with which of course Sprevak agrees. However, it is 
interesting to note just how sensitive our judgments are to the way the scenario is set up. For 
example, let’s say we begin not, as Sprevak does, with the desktop program, but by imagining a 
Martian who has an inner program capable of calculating the dates of the Mayan calendar 5,000 
years into the future. Even though, by hypothesis, this piece of inner machinery is never actually 
used, it might seem that we should have no misgivings about awarding it cognitive status. This 
appears to be at odds with the conclusion drawn previously. Yet it seems all we have done is 
reverse the order in which the cases are considered. What is going on?  
 
When we begin our reflections on the issues, as Sprevak does, by focusing on an example of a 
desktop program, our natural tendency is to think of an isolated and easily removable software 
application, sitting on a machine that sometimes achieves fancy feats of text-editing, graphics, 
and information storage, but which, in the end, is no more than a sophisticated tool for work or 
play. This encourages us to find it wildly unlikely that the program in question could ever count 
as cognitive, even if it were to be transported inside a Martian head. On the other hand, when 
we begin our consideration of the issues by imagining the Martian inner program, our natural 
tendency is to think of that mechanism as being already functionally integrated into (although 
not yet activated within) an organized economy of states and processes. Those states and 
processes are intimately embedded in subtle and complex perceptual, memory and reasoning 
systems that have been evolved or developed in relation to each other, and that already meet 
whatever the criteria are for cognitive status. If the desktop program for calculating the Mayan 
calendar were a functionally integrated element in this kind of economy, then it may seem far 
less crazy to conclude that it could be a cognitive mechanism, or at least part of one, even 
though it is spatially located outside the head. Various factors might pump our intuitions in this 
direction. Perhaps the program is configured to reflect a particular individual’s favoured kind of 
interface, and has been made remotely accessible through real-time mobile computing 
technology or will, in the future, be made available at the firing of a neuron through a brain 
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implant that connects the mechanism to a wireless network. Never mind the cyborg imagery. 
However we develop the basic idea, the resulting image is a long way from the one suggested 
by the scenario as described by Sprevak. In other words, the apparently fickle nature of our 
intuitions may be explained in terms of subtle changes to the details of the hypothetical 
example, changes that have been surreptitiously introduced by the variation in set-up.  
 
